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Liquidated damages provision held invalid
Having decided to apply § 1671 (d), the court
next laid out the test for when liquidated damages are
valid under this subdivision. This test consists of two
elements which must be satisfied. First, it must have
been "impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the
actual damage." Civil Code § 1671(d). Second, the
amount of the damages "must represent the results of a
reasonable endeavor by the parties to estimate a fair
average compensation for any loss that may be sus-
tained." Garrett v. Coast & Southern Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn., 511 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1973). If either of these
elements is not met, the liquidated damages provision is
void, and the breaching party is liable only for the actual
damages which result from the breach.
The court first looked at the "reasonable
endeavor" test. The court again cited to the Garrett
decision, which says that a court must look to a party's
motivation and purpose in imposing the liquidated
damages. While the Bank argued that its purpose was
merely to recoup its cost, there was much evidence at
trial which indicated that the Bank intended to generate
profits through its late and overlimit fees, profits
designed to exceed the actual damages suffered. The
court of appeal held that the trial court had adequately
weighed the evidence on this issue, and refused to
question the trial court's decision that the Bank's
motivation was to generate profits above and beyond its
actual loss.
In making its decision that the Bank had not
made a reasonable endeavor to estimate loss, the trial
court was persuaded by the fact that the Bank had
undertaken no form of analysis to determine its potential
losses from a breach. The Bank argued that this repre-
sented error, because the law does not require a formal
analysis or cost study. The court of appeal found no
error, explaining that the trial court had not required a
cost study per se, merely "some form of analysis." The
court supported this requirement by the trial court,
stating that an estimate of loss "cannot occur without
some sort of analysis of the loss that is to be compen-
sated."
As the court of appeal found no error in the
trial court's ruling on the "reasonable endeavor" issue, it
did not examine the impracticability issue. Because the
Bank did not make a reasonable endeavor to estimate the
loss resulting from a breach, the court affirmed the
ruling that the liquidated damages provision in the credit
card agreement was void under § 1671 (d). The court
thus upheld that portion of the plaintiffs' judgment
which represented the fees collected as liquidated
damages.
Case closes a chapter in credit card fee
litigation
In sum, the California Court of Appeal reduced
the $13,971,830 judgment for the plaintiffs by
$9,076,304, which represented the Bank's actual
damages. Nevertheless, the court upheld the remaining
$4,895,526 of the judgment, representing invalid
liquidated damages that the Bank assessed upon the
plaintiffs in the form of late and overlimit fees for their
breach of the credit card agreement. However, the court
noted in conclusion that new legislation expressly
permits credit card issuers to impose late and overlimit
fees of certain amounts. Fin.Code, § 4001, subd. (a).
Thus, this case "appears to close a chapter in credit card
fee litigation."
Departure from established tort theories
inappropriate for breast implant litigation
by Dana Shannon
The court in In re New
York State Silicone Breast Implant
Litigation, 631 N.Y.S. 2d 491, 166
Misc. 2d 85 (1995), held that the
plaintiffs' claim for market share
liability is inapplicable to breast
implants since manufacturers are
generally ascertainable, and all
manufacturers' products are not
identical. Additionally, the court
held that the plaintiffs' claim for
concert of action liability is inappro-
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priate since no evidence exists that
the manufacturers agreed to commit
a tort or acted to further an agree-
ment to commit a tortious act.
Accordingly, the court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss the
portions of the plaintiffs' complaint
seeking market share and concert of
action liability.
The plaintiffs, whom
allegedly suffered damages due to
silicone breast implants ("im-
plants"), sued assorted manufactur-
ers of the implants and silicone gel
manufacturers (collectively, "the
defendants"). Plaintiffs contend that
the implanted prostheses caused
various physical maladies. Although
the complaint contained a variety of
claims, the instant case concerned
only the motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
market share and concert of action
theories.
Market share liability hinges
on fungibility of product and
inability to identify the
manufacturer
The court noted that both
market share liability, which results
in several liability, and concert of
action liability, which establishes
joint and several liability, deviate
from established tort law and are
used sparingly by the courts.
Turning its focus on market share
liability, the court noted that market
share liability first appeared in
Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924
(Cal. 1984), a case involving
diethylstilbestrol ("DES"), a
synthetic hormone. In Sindell,
several defendants acted identically,
thus any one of them might have
caused the plaintiff's harm. The
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court remarked that Sindell ap-
proved market share liability based
on several factors, including the
desire that a wrongdoer bear the cost
of injury rather than an innocent
plaintiff whose suit would be
dismissed due to her inability to
identify a particular manufacturer.
The court similarly referred
to the first New York case allowing
market share liability, Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly and Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069
(N.Y. 1989). Hymowitz, the court
noted, involved mass litigation over
DES, and Hymowitz, like Sindell,
turned on the identicality of the
product, the generic marketing, and
the resulting inability of the plain-
tiffs to identify the particular
manufacturer responsible for the
injurious drug.
Next, the court considered
the use of market share liability
outside the DES context. The court
again emphasized the extreme rarity
with which courts allow market
share liability actions to proceed.
The overriding reason courts reject
market share theories, the court
noted, is that the product at issue is
not fungible.
Turning to the issue before
them, the court found that breast
implants are not fungible products,
and that implant manufacturers are
identifiable. Specifically, the court
found:
"[t]here are differ-
ences in the design and
composition of the
implants; the warning
inserts in each of the
products vary; and the
products are not
generically marketed.
Most importantly, the
majority of women
involved in the breast
implant litigation have
been able to identify all
or some of the manufac-
turers of their implants."
In addition, the court noted that
manufacturers market under specific
manufacturer names. Recalling that
Hymowitz found market share
liability necessary in the context of
an identical generically marketed
product, the court found breast
implants distinguishable. The court
dismissed plaintiffs' claim for
market share liability, noting that in
the realm of implants such a sharp
deviation from traditional tort
theories is unwarranted.
Concert of action liability
requires an agreement to
commit a tortious act
Next, the court evaluated
plaintiffs' claim for concert of action
liability. Plaintiffs asserted that the
defendants' statements to govern-
mental agencies and the defendants'
product marketing made a concert of
action theory appropriate. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants met to prepare implanta-
tion standards and devise responses
to both the FDA and a Congres-
sional subcommittee charged with
evaluating implants. In addition, the
plaintiffs argued that all of the
manufacturers depended upon early
silicone research by the same
chemical company, then marketed
the product before it underwent
sufficient testing, thereby hiding or
distorting known risks.
The court noted that
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concert of action liability results
from an express or tacit understand-
ing of a common agreement among
all defendants to carry out a tortious
act. Furthermore, each defendant
must have committed a tort, and at
least one defendant must have
committed a tortious act stemming
from the agreement among the
defendants. However, mere parallel
activity among the defendants, such
as in marketing and product devel-
opment, the court noted, fails to
prove the agreement required to
maintain a concert of action theory.
The court found that the plaintiffs'
reliance on the defendants' market-
ing methods and statements to
governmental entities were mis-
placed. The court found that the
defendants' activities were parallel
and therefore precisely the type of
activities that fail to establish
concert of action liability. Further-
more, the court noted that the
plaintiffs made no showing of an
express or tacit agreement to carry
out a tort, nor had proof surfaced of
any action taken pursuant to such an
agreement. Thus, the court dis-
missed plaintiffs' claim based on a
concert of action theory.
State law preempts Housing Authority's lease
provision
by Jane Cady
In Doe v. Portland Housing Authority, 656
A.2d 1200 (Me. 1995), the Supreme Court of Maine
denied a request to invalidate a provision contained
within a Portland Housing Authority ("PHA") lease. The
lease provision banned the possession of all firearms on
leased premises. The court held that Maine law pre-
empted the PHA regulation because the state law
overrode the PHA lease clause. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit.
25, § 2011 (West 1994). Because of the preemption, the
court found it unnecessary to explore any of the consti-
tutional issues raised by the appellants.
The appellants, Jane and John Doe, were both
skilled and licensed gun users who possessed firearms in
their PHA residence. They contended the PHA lease
violated several of their constitutional rights, including
the right to bear arms, the right to defend life and liberty,
and equal protection of the laws. The trial court held the
lease provision did not violate these constitutional
guarantees. Additionally, the trial court found state law
did not preempt the PHA ban on firearms. Therefore, the
court upheld the lease provision and denied the Does'
request.
PHA qualifies as a political subdivision
The Supreme Court of Maine decided if the
PHA qualified as a political subdivision within the
meaning of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 25, § 2011 (West
1994), it was not necessary to examine the constitutional
issues raised by the appellants. State law preempts
regulations of its constituents' political units if there is
an expressed intent to do so. Thus, if PHA is a political
subdivision, title 25, section 2011 of the Maine Code
preempts its firearm regulation.
The PHA contended there is no preemption
because only orders, ordinances, rules, and regulations
of political subdivisions are affected. The PHA argued it
is not a political subdivision because it is not specifically
enumerated in the statute. Secondly, the purpose of title
25, section 2011 of the Maine Code is to make firearm
regulations uniform so that hunters traveling through
Maine will not be subjected to different regulations
when they cross town lines. Therefore, the PHA claimed
that the legislature had no intent to preempt the PHA
lease.
The statute is not clear on its face whether the
PHA is a political subdivision. The PHA is neither
defined within the statute nor specifically named as one
of the enumerated examples. However, the statute makes
it clear that the enumerated agencies are only examples
and the list is nonexclusive. Therefore, the Maine
Supreme Court turned to the legislative history to assist
in the interpretation of the statute.
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